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ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN REPRESENTING ALIENS
APPLYING FOR VISAS BASED ON MARRIAGES TO
UNITED STATES CITIZENS
I. INTRODUCTION
How would you respond to a client who has asked you to file a
petition for an immigrant visa to the United States by virtue of his or
her questionable "marriage" to a United States citizen? If you decide
to provide representation, and the marriage is found to be fraudu-
lent, your legal career could be in jeopardy.
Currently, sham marriages pose a formidable problem for the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).' A marriage is clas-
sified as void for immigration purposes if the INS determines that it
was invalid at its inception.' Although the INS conducts an inter-
view of couples to substantiate their intent to establish a married
life,' a large percentage of sham marriages escape detection." The
© 1988 by Taryn L. Hook
1. L.A. Daily J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 4, col. 3 [hereinafter L.A. Daily J.]. "Government
data shows that while total immigration dropped 5.2% from fiscal year 1978 to fiscal 1985, the
number of immigrants arriving as spouses of citizens soared 59%." Id. Many of these unions
are shams. Id.
2. The general rule is that a marriage adhering to all the requirements of the law, but
which the parties enter into with no good faith intent to live together and which is designed to
circumvent the immigration laws will not be recognized. In re Phillis, 15 I & N Dec. 385
(BIA 1975); In re Matti, I & N Interim Dec. No. 2960 (BIA 1984); In re Laureano, I & N
Interim Dec. No. 2951 (BIA 1983); see generally Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604
(1953). Luttwak involved criminal convictions based on a fraudulent scheme to gain entry for
two brothers under the "War Brides Act." The brothers married U.S. citizens for the purpose
of evading the immigration laws. The parties agreed beforehand to separate as soon as possi-
ble, and none of them ever coinhabited. See also Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir.
1975). In Bark, the court reversed the holding of the circuit court which denied petitioner
adjustment of status because the marriage on which he based his application was a sham. The
court of appeals stated that conduct of the parties after marriage is not determinative of the
parties intent to establish a life together at the time of the marriage. Thus, the fact that the
couple separated after the marriage was not the sole basis on which immigration benefits were
denied.
3. T. FRAGOMEN, IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 11-3 (1983). See generally
Danilov, Marriage, Divorce, Legal Separation and the Alien, 18 INT'L LAW. 675, 680
(1984), which elaborates on the two-step process by which the INS determines marital viabil-
ity. In the first step, the husband and wife are interviewed separately and asked detailed ques-
tions concerning their married life. The second step involves post-marital surveillance of the
couple. See also Note, The Constitutionality of the INS Sham Marriage Investigation Policy,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1238, 1249 (1986), which suggests that the INS interviewing techniques
violate the constitutional right of privacy.
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rise in sham marriage statistics is due in part to the scarcity of visas
available for qualified applicants."
Immigrant visas are allocated according to strict numerical and
categorical requirements.' Spouses of United States citizens, how-
ever, are not subject to numerical restrictions.' These fortunate indi-
viduals gain immediate status as lawful, permanent residents.' Thus,
marriage to a United States citizen is an especially attractive and
expeditious route to the "American Dream." As one commentator
noted: "So beneficial is the status of 'spouse of a U.S. citizen,' so
simple is the procedure, so high the success rate, that it becomes
more and more difficult to dissuade clients from taking this route to
a Green Card."'
Because of increasing INS concern about sham marriages and
stiff penalties for those who perpetrate them,'0 it is important that
attorneys fully understand the legal and ethical ramifications of rep-
resenting clients seeking marriage visas.
An attorney's ethical conduct as a member of the Immigration
Bar is governed by federal statutes and regulations." In addition, the
4. Statistics indicate that marriage fraud is increasing. In 1986, there were 100,000 visa
applications based on marriages to United States citizens, a 59% increase from the year before.
The INS estimates that one-third of more than 1,000 of these marriages are fraudulent. L.A.
Daily J., supra note 1; but see INS Success in Detecting Marital Fraud Questioned, 59 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 144 (1982) (letter by attorney implies that as many as ninety-nine
percent of sham marriages are not detected by the INS).
5. See generally T. ALEINKOFF, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 96, 101 (1985).
The wait for a visa to the United States is sometimes as long as ten years. Id.
6. The United States has a worldwide limitation of 270,000 immigrants per year, dis-
tributed among six categories. Visas are allocated to: (1) unmarried sons or daughters of U.S.
citizens; (2) spouses and unmarried sons or daughters of lawful resident aliens; (3) qualified
immigrants who are members of the professions or who display exceptional ability in the sci-
ences or arts; (4) married sons or married daughters of U.S. citizens; (5) brothers and sisters of
U.S. citizens who are twenty-one years old; and (6) qualified immigrants who perform skilled
or unskilled labor for which there is a shortage of U.S. citizens to perform the work. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1153(a)(1)-(6) (1982).
7. Id. § 1151(a). See also L.A. Daily J., supra note 1. This article states that
"[mlarriage confers a permanent residency certificate, commonly referred to as a 'green card,'
that allows aliens to hold legal jobs and entitles them to all benefits afforded any American,
such as food stamps, welfare, student loans."
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) and (b) (1982).
9. 59 INTERPRETER RELEASES 144 (1982).
10. The penalties imposed on an alien for participating in a sham marriage are severe.
Deportation is almost a certainty. In addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1154 precludes the alien from receiv-
ing an immigrant visa based on any of the familial relationships enumerated in the Code. J.
HING, HANDLING IMMIGRATION CASES § 4.24 (1985). See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)
(1986) (stating that "no petition shall be approved if the alien" has entered the United States
on an immigrant visa based on a "marriage determined by the Attorney General to have been
entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.") Id.
11. 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a)(3) (1988). This code section allows suspension or disbarment
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American Bar Association's Model Code and Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct as modified or ratified by the states prescribe ethical
norms.
12
This comment addresses the ethical problems encountered by
attorneys in their attempts to decipher the cases, federal regulations,
and state law in the context of sham marriages. First, case law is
analyzed. In this context, the reckless disregard test is discussed in
terms of its relationship to the attorney-client privilege."3 Second, the
principles contained within the Model Code and Rules are applied
to the attorney's role in handling marriage visas. Here, the legal
practitioner's responsibility in exposing marital fraud is explored.
This comment then studies the obligation imposed on the attorney by
the attorney-client privilege to disclose suspected client perjury. Fi-
nally, suggestions are offered for the clarification of the ethical obli-
gations imposed on the attorney who represents aliens attempting to
immigrate through marriage.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Standards of Conduct: INS and Federal Regulations
1. Structure and Jurisdiction of the INS
The power to enforce immigration laws is vested in the Attor-
ney General. 4 It is his responsibility to "guard the frontiers, to de-
termine the admissibility of those who seek to enter, and to expel
for any attorney who "willfully misleads, misinforms, or deceives an officer or employee of the
Department of Justice concerning any material and relevant fact in connection with a case."
Id. Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) states, "whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction
of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or
covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact ...shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Id.
12. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1), DR 4-101(A),
(B)(1) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.16, 3.3, 1.6 (1983); see
generally Hersh, Ethical Considerations of the Immigration Lawyer, 51 FLA. B.J. 18, 21
(1977). See Heiserman, Professional Responsibility in Immigration Practice and Government
Service, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 971, 978 (1985).
13. See infra text accompanying note 68.
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982) states:
The Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and enforce-
ment of this Chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and natural-
ization of aliens, except insofar as this Chapter or such laws relate to the pow-
ers, functions, and duties conferred upon the President, the Secretary of State:
...[but, the] determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to
all questions of law shall be controlling.
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aliens not entitled to remain in the United States."'" Congress has
specifically granted the Attorney General the option to delegate his
duties to an officer or employee of the Department of Justice." Con-
sequently, the Attorney General exercises these powers through the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Depart-
ment of Justice. 7
The INS handles such matters as visa petitions, adjustments of
status, citizenship adjudications, and deportations.' The Commis-
sion of Immigration and Naturalization heads the INS and is au-
thorized to exercise all the functions delegated to the Attorney Gen-
eral by Congress. 9
Because the INS is a federal agency, it has exclusive jurisdiction
over members of the Immigration Bar. 0 Federal Immigration Regu-
lations preempt state immigration laws." Thus, the disciplinary ac-
tion taken by the Attorney General is final,"2 and may not be contra-
dicted by state laws.
Organizationally, the INS Commissioner is assisted by four As-
sociate Commissioners, each with varying responsibilities.2 The ba-
sic operating unit of the INS is the district office,2' which is primar-
15. C. GORDON & E. GORDON, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW § 1.4 (Student
ed. 1982).
16. The Attorney General is "authorized to confer or impose upon any employee of the
United States, with the consent of the head of the Department . . . any of the powers, privi-
leges, or duties conferred or imposed by this Chapter." 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982).
17. Id.
18. T. ALEINKOFF, supra note 5, at 82-87.
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982).
20. 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a) (1988); But see Koden v. United States Dept. of Justice, 564
F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1977) (any court or administrative agency which has the power to
admit attorneys to practice has the authority to disbar or discipline attorneys for unprofessional
conduct).
21. See Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) ("over no con-
ceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete" than it is over the admis-
sion of aliens); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (the power to exclude aliens is
"inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defend-
ing the country against foreign encroachments and dangers, a power to be exercised exclusively
by the political branches of government"); see, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)
(the Court held that the Federal Alien Registration Act preempted the Pennsylvania alien
registration provisions).
22. 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(b) (1988).
23. T. ALEINKOFF, supra note 5, at 83.
24. T. ALEINKOFF, supra note 5, at 83. The central INS office is located in Washing-
ton, D.C. There are also four regional INS offices, which are subdivided into thirty-four dis-
trict offices, headed by a district director. In turn, the district offices are divided into suboffices.
Lawyers handling matters about individual aliens would not go to the Washington, D.C. of-
fice, but would take immigration matters to the local district office. T. ALEINKOFF, supra note
5, at 83.
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ily concerned with matters of enforcement, adjudication, and service
tasks." ' Each district office is staffed by immigration judges who con-
duct exclusion and deportation proceedings, and who preside over a
wide array of immigration hearings.2
Aliens may appeal adverse decisions to the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA), a separate division of the Department of Jus-
tice. 17 The BIA is a quasi-judicial body which reviews the findings
of the immigration judges. 8 One of the main functions of the BIA is
to regulate membership of the Immigration Bar and "suspend or bar
from further practice"29 attorneys who violate INS regulations.
Disciplinary actions against an attorney begin with the regional
commissioner of the INS. 0 If the regional commissioner's investiga-
tion reveals good cause for suspension or disbarment,"1 the attorney
may request a hearing before an officer designated by the regional
commissioner.82 If the Board finds that suspension or disbarment is
warranted, the Attorney General makes the final disposition on the
case." The errant attorney is then prevented from practicing immi-
gration law anywhere in the United States until the adjudicator or-
ders otherwise.84
2. Federal Statutes and INS Regulations
Attorneys are subject to both INS regulations and federal stat-
utes. INS regulations allow disciplinary action if an attorney "will-
25. T. ALEINKOFF, supra note 5, at 83.
26. T. ALEINKOFF, supra note 5, at 89.
27. T. ALEINKOFF, supra note 5, at 91. The INS regulations allow aliens excludable or
deportable the right to appeal to the BIA, a five member review board, appointed by the
Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1988).
28. T. ALEINKOFF, supra note 5, at 91-92.
29. 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a) (1988).
30. The responsibility for initiating disciplinary proceedings is vested in the re-
gional commissioner. . . . If . . . investigation establishes to the regional com-
missioner's satisfaction that disciplinary proceedings are warranted, he prefers
written charges, serving the respondent personally or by registered mail, and
giving him a period of at least 30 days to show cause why he should not be
suspended or debarred from further practice. . . The respondent may request
a hearing, which will be granted before an officer designated by the regional
commissioner. When the record is completed the regional commissioner for-
wards it to the Board.
C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 15, § 1.15b(2).
31. C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 15, § 1.15b(2).
32. C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 15, § 1.15b(2).
33. C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 15, § 1.15b(2).
34. 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(b) (1988) states: "When the final decision is for suspension or
disbarment, the attorney/representative shall not thereafter be permitted to practice until au-
thorized by the adjudicator rendering the final decision." Id.
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fully misleads, misinforms, or deceives an officer or employee of the
Department of Justice concerning any material and relevant fact in
connection with a case." ' 5
Federal criminal convictions in this area stem from violations of
United States Code chapter 18, section 1001, which mandates prison
terms or stiff fines for those who "knowingly and willfully" falsify a
"material fact" when within the "jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States." 6 A violation of this statute usually
occurs during the initial stages of the visa application process. Aliens
wishing to obtain visas usually retain attorneys to file visa applica-
tions at the INS district office (1-30 petitions" in the case of mar-
riage visas). Lawyers who provide inaccurate information concerning
their client's visa eligibility are deemed to have falsified a material
fact for the purposes of Federal Immigration Regulations, 8 and neg-
ative consequences may result.
In United States v. Lopez," for example, the defendant attorney
falsified the priority dates on his clients' visa applications in order to
accelerate their entry into the United States."0 Lopez claimed that
his actions were not material within the statutory definition because
he falsified the prior dates not to defraud the INS, but to expedite
the administrative procedure (which would allow for his client's en-
try). He contended that the success of his scheme did not depend on
the false priority dates being overlooked, but on their being discov-
ered by the INS. Thus, Lopez argued that the falsifications had no
capacity to influence INS activity.4 The court rejected this argu-
ment, finding that the falsifications were material because they in-
35. Id.
36. See supra note 11 for text of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
37. Three important considerations dictate whether a person will be considered a
"spouse": (1) validity of the marriage at the time it was performed; (2) existence of the mar-
riage at present; and (3) a valid purpose in entering into the marriage. T. FRAGOMEN, supra
note 3, at 11-18.
38. United States v. Bithoney, 472 F.2d 16 (2d Cir.) (attorney made false statement that
his client took an oath as to validity of petition for relative visa), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 938
(1973); In re Milstein, 49 A.D.2d 881, 373 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1975) (conspiring to make a false
petition to the INS for the issuance of an immigrant visa on the basis of a sham marriage
arranged by the attorney warrants resignation); United States v. Maniego, 710 F.2d 24 (2d
Cir. 1983) (criminal conviction of attorney based on conspiracy to defraud the INS arising
from sham marriage scheme sustained); In re Leifer, 80 A.D.2d 272, 438 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1981)
(attorney suspended from practicing law for two years and eight months because of defrauding
INS).
39. 728 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 733 F.2d 908 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 828 (1984).
40. Id. at 1361.
41. Id. at 1362.
[Vol. 28
SHAM MARRIAGES
creased the INS's paperwork and manpower requirements and
greatly inconvenienced the Agency in general.4
B. The Model Code and Rules of Professional Conduct
In addition to federal regulations, attorneys are subject to the
American Bar Association's Model Code or Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct if adopted by the state where they practice. 8
The American Bar Association is the primary source of ethical
standards for attorneys practicing in the United States." The ABA
created ethical norms as model guidelines to be adopted by each
state's bar association. Ideally, they may also be incorporated into
the state's legislation or sanctioned by the state supreme court."
Most states have adopted, with minor modifications, the Model
Code.4" Furthermore, many states have replaced the Model Code
with the Model Rules. 47
Federal agencies are not bbund by state versions of either the
ethical Rules or the Code.4 8 Most federal courts, however, treat state
codes as binding authority and many officially recognize the Model
Code. 49
1. Model Code
The Model Code originated from the Canons of Professional
Ethics, drafted in 1908.50 In 1969, the Canons were replaced by the
ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code consists of
42. Id.
43. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
44. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege 66 CALIF. L.
REV. 1061, 1064 (1978). Hazard notes that the ABA's purpose in promulgating its ethics code
is to "establish prevailing norms governing the responsibilities of the attorney in the attorney-
client relationship .. " Id.
45. Id. at 1065 n.14. The "legal status" of ethics rules adopted by the states is ambigu-
ous. Some courts treat state ethics codes as guidelines adopted by the courts. Other states,
however, transform their ethical standards into legislation which can only be challenged on the
basis of their unconstitutionality. Id.
46. L. PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 6
(1984).
47. L. PATTERSON, supra note 46. There are now thirty states that have adopted the
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT with some modifications. ABA/BNA, LAWYERS
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.3 (1988).
48. L. PATTERSON, supra note 46, at 7.
49. L. PATrERSON, supra note 46, at 7. See also In Re Campos, 737 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.
1984). In Campos, the defendant attorney filed an appeal with the INS in order to prolong the
INS's judgment on the immigrant status of his client. The court expressly recognized the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility as the proper ethics code for attorneys to follow. Id.
50. Perillo, A Case for Increased Confidentiality, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 5 (1985).
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three parts:51 Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
Rules. The Canons are "axiomatic norms '52 which regulate lawyers'
relationships with clients and other attorneys. 8 The Ethical Consid-
erations signify the highest moral objectives which attorneys should
strive to achieve. 4
2. Model Rules
The Model Rules were drafted by a special commission of the
ABA in response to the perceived inadequacy of the Code to meet
the demands of a changing legal environment. 5 The Rules were
adopted by the ABA on August 2, 1983, and are intended to sup-
plant the Model Code as the official policy of the ABA. 56 The for-
mat of the Rules consists of rules of ethical conduct followed by com-
mentary explaining their scope.57
Neither the Code nor the Rules prescribe punishments for ethi-
cal violations.5 8 Instead, state courts'confer penalties as "determined
by the character of the offense and the attendant circumstances."59
Disciplinary measures by state bar associations include disbarment,
suspension, and private reprimands. 60
Thus, attorneys who violate immigration laws are subject to dis-
barment or suspension from two distinct sources. 6' First, the Immi-
51. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1979).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. id.
55. Giffen, The New ABA Ethics Rules: A Change for the Better?, 39 J. Mo. BAR. 534
(1983). Giffen notes that the dissatisfaction with the Model Code arose from "loosened restric-
tions on lawyer advertising, a growth in the number of government lawyers reentering private
practice, and novel arrangements for providing legal services 'which' all threatened to make
portions of the Code irrelevant." The major factor, however, "was the perceived failure of the
present Code to provide adequate guidance to the legal profession." Id. at 534.
56. L. PATTERSON, supra note 46, at 6.
57. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1983). "The Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes
of legal representation and of the law itself. . . . The Rules are thus partly obligatory and
disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer's professional
role." Id.
58. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1979); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1983).
59. In Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Steiner, 204 La. 1073, 16 So. 2d 843 (1944), Justice
Higgins stated in his concurring opinion, "Itihe severity of the judgment of this court should be
in proportion to the gravity of the offenses, the moral turpitude involved, and the extent that
the defendants' acts and conduct affect his professional qualifications to practice law." Id. at
1079-80, 16 So. 2d at 850 (Higgins, J. concurring).
60. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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gration Bar may preclude an attorney from practicing immigration
law before the BIA. 2 Second, state bar associations may level any
punishment deemed appropriate for violations of the state ethics
code."'
C. Duty to Investigate Client Fraud
1. Case Law: The Reckless Disregard Test Versus the Clear
and Convincing Evidence Test
As discussed above, attorneys who file fraudulent information
with the INS risk severe sanctions." The general test for determin-
ing whether an attorney knew or should have known about his or
her client's fraud was first developed in United States v. Sarantos."
Sarantos was an attorney convicted of conspiracy to deceive the
INS in connection with arranging sham marriages between United
States citizens and Greek nationals." The jury was instructed to find
Sarantos guilty if they determined that he acted with "reckless disre-
gard of whether the statements made were true or with a conscious
effort to avoid learning the truth. . . even though he was not specif-
ically aware of the facts which would establish the falsity of the
statements."O7
Sarantos unsuccessfully objected on the grounds that the reck-
less disregard standard was not sufficient to constitute knowledge as
required by United States Code chapter 18, section 1001.8 He
maintained that the reckless disregard test undermined the attorney-
client relationship by forcing attorneys to become "investigative arms
of the government." 9
United States v. Maniego0 also involved federal conspiracy
62. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
65. 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972).
66. Id. at 879.
67. Id. at 880.
68. Id. at 881. See also United States v. Egenberg, 441 F.2d 441, 444 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). The court held fraudulent tax returns filed for departing
aliens from a year prior to indictment were sufficient to show motive and fraudulent intent.
The jury need only find that the defendant acted with reckless disregard as to whether the
statement was true or that defendant acted with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the
truth. See also United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832
(1970). In Abrams, the appellant was not specifically aware of what his client's plans for
departure were, but the jury could infer from the evidence that the appellant acted with reck-
less disregard as to whether the statements were true or not.
69. United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2nd Cir. 1972).
70. 710 F.2d 24 (1983).
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charges against an attorney for arranging sham marriages. Although
the defendant acknowledged the falsity of the information he gave
the INS, he denied knowledge of his client's ruse at the time he filed
the visa documents.71 Citing Sarantos with approval, the court con-
cluded that the defendant displayed " 'deliberate avoidance of posi-
tive knowledge' that [he] had 'every reason to believe was the
fact.' ",M2
a. The Reckless Disregard Test in State Courts
State courts, including California's, have also utilized variations
on the reckless disregard test to establish culpability in marriage
fraud schemes.7 In Weir v. State Bar,7' the California Supreme
Court disbarred an attorney for knowingly submitting false informa-
tion to the INS; settling a claim without client's consent; and con-
verting entrusted funds for his own use and benefit.7 ' The court
found that the petitioner knew or should have known allegations in
the document filed with the INS were false, despite his denial that
he had no "knowledge or reason to believe the marriages were fraud-
ulent." 6 The court disbarred the attorney even though the discipli-
nary bar failed to uncover clear and convincing evidence of the peti-
tioner's involvement in the scheme.7
b. The Clear and Convincing Evidence Test
A second standard used by the courts to prove an attorney's un-
ethical practice is the clear and convincing evidence test."' This stan-
dard was condoned by the United States District Court in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center). In Legal Services
Center, the defendants were attorneys charged with conspiring to de-
71. Id. at 28.
72. Id. (citing the lower court opinion).
73. See 61 INTERPrrE RERLEAsES 442 (1984). The Texas District 10 Grievance Com-
mittee reprimanded a lawyer for failing to adequately investigate the marital status of his
client before filing with the INS. "The attorney knew or should have known that his client's
marital status was questionable." Id. (emphasis added). See also Weir v. State Bar, 23 Cal.
3d 564, 591 P.2d 19, 152 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1979) (defendant knew or should have known
allegations in documents filed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service were false).
74. 23 Cal. 3d 564, 591 P.2d 19, 152 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1979).
75. Id. at 569, 591 P.2d at 24, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
76. Id. at 570, 591 P.2d at 20, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
77. Id.
78. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center), 615 F. Supp. 958 (D. Mass.
1985).
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fraud the INS. 7' The charges arose after they filed a section 1-30
petition on behalf of their clients. The INS denied the first petition
on the grounds that the petitioners' marriage was invalid.8" The gov-
ernment relied on Sarantos, alleging that defendants displayed reck-
less disregard for the truth in failing to validate their clients' story."1
The court sanctioned the clear and convincing evidence test in-
stead, a stricter standard for establishing client fraud."a The court
held that the obligation to investigate the veracity of a client's story
arose only when "clear information"83 of fraud existed. Embracing
Sarantos's argument, the court stated: "So long as the attorney does
not have obvious indications of the client's fraud or perjury, the at-
torney is not obligated to undertake an independent determination
before advancing his client's position.""
2. ABA Code and Rules
Although the courts have not yet defined the attorney's duty to
investigate the validity of a client's marriage in the context of the
Model Code and Rules, several sections are applicable. First, DR 7-
102(A) of the Code states: "In his representation of a client, a law-
yer shall not . . .[plarticipate in the creation or preservation of evi-
dence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false."" 5
The Rules contain a parallel section which states that "[a] lawyer
shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. .... so
Both of these provisions aid in determining that level of knowl-
edge sufficient to constitute the creation or preservation of a sham
marriage.8 7 This issue of the cognizance level necessary to sustain a
criminal conviction in turn raises questions concerning the extent to
which attorneys must substantiate the truth of their client's asser-
79. Id. at 960.
80. Id. at 969.
81. Id. at 968.
82. Id. at 969.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5)(6) (1979)
states:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows
or it is obvious that the evidence is false.
86. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983).
87. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(6).
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tions under the Code and Rules.
D. Duty to Disclose Client Fraud
1. Case Law
If attorneys are required to substantiate their clients' claims, the
law must mandate to what extent the attorney's knowledge of a
sham marriage requires disclosure to the INS. Both federal and state
courts have implied that a duty to disclose sham marriages to the
proper authorities exists.8
In United States v. Rubenstein," the defendant attorney knew
of his client's intent to divorce in six months, yet he prepared the
immigration documents without disclosing this material fact to the
INS." The court stated that Rubenstein's knowledge of his client's
intent to divorce constituted suppression of a material fact, even
though the marriage was valid at the time Rubenstein filed the mar-.
riage visa.9
The Rubenstein doctrine was again utilized in the 1985 court of
appeals case, United States v. Chung Yup Yum." Even though
Yum's clients were legally married, he was prosecuted for failing to
reveal the sham nature of their marriage."' Although the legal valid-
ity of the union was not challenged, the parties' lack of mutual intent
to live as man and wife nullified their marriage for immigration pur-
poses."" An attorney aware of his client's untruths, the court held, is
subject to federal criminal charges. 5
At the state level, an attorney must also reveal client fraud to
the INS. In In re Timon," the defendant attorney was convicted of
filing fraudulent visa petitions on his client's behalf. Later, at hear-
ings to scrutinize his client's marriage, Timon refused to disclose his
client's guise . 7 The court suspended Timon from practice for eigh-
teen months for perpetrating a deliberate fraud on the government."
Timon, however, perceived his duty to file the visa forms as
88. See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
89. 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
90. Id. at 917.
91. Id. at 918.
92. 776 F.2d 490 (1985).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 40 A.D.2d 58, 337 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1972).
97. Id. at 59, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
98. Id.
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being ministerial in nature. He argued that the information con-
tained on the petitions was accurate and he advised his clients that
"all petitions were subject to investigation and substantiation by the
INS."'
in a similar situation, a Texas Bar Grievance Committee issued
a private admonishment to an attorney who provided false informa-
tion to the INS. Although the attorney claimed he was unaware the
marriage was void when he filed the 1-30 form, he discovered its
falsity shortly thereafter. The committee admonished the defendant
for not timely advising the INS of his client's ruse.' 00
2. ABA Code and Rules
Whether or not a lawyer may reveal client confidences is deter-
mined by both evidence law and the Code and Rules of Professional
Conduct.' The attorney-client privilege is founded in evidentiary
law.' 2 The evidentiary privilege applies in judicial and other pro-
ceedings where a lawyer may be compelled to produce evidence re-
garding a client. In all other areas where the attorney-client privilege
is inapplicable, the Code or Rules dictate when an attorney may or
may not reveal client confidences.' 03
99. Id. See also Oklahoma Bar Association v. Kirk, 723 P.2d 264 (Okla. 1986). In Kirk,
the defendant attorney procured sham marriages for his clients. The court punished the de-
fendant for not making "known to the I.N.S. authorities the fraudulent nature of the mar-
riage." Id. at 265.
100. 61 INTERPRETER RELEASES 442 (1984). See supra note 73.
101. Hazard, supra note 44, at 1061. Hazard notes:
The attorney-client privilege may well be the pivotal element of the modern
American lawyer's professional functions. It is considered indispensable to the
lawyer's function as advocate on the theory that the advocate can adequately
prepare a case only if the client is free to disclose everything, bad as well as
good. The privilege is also considered necessary to the lawyer's function as con-
fidential counselor in law on the similar theory that the legal counselor can
properly advise the client what to do only if the client is free to make full
disclosure.
Id.
102. Id. at 1063 n.7.
103. For purposes of this comment, only the ethical privilege is discussed.
Since the core of the legal structure is the adversary system, lawyers are expected to
represent clients to the best of their abilities, zealously guarding their clients' interests. As
advocates, lawyers can adequately prepare a case only if the client feels free to disclose all
relevant facts about his situation. Wigmore defines the attorney-client privilege as follows:(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advi-
sor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4)
made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently pro-
tected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the
protection may be waived.
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The policy behind the attorney-client privilege is reflected in
both the Model Code and the Model Rules, the latter being broader
in scope. 1  Canon 4 of the Code states that a lawyer should "pre-
serve the confidences and secrets of a client." 105 DR 4-101 qualifies
this concept by dictating that: "[A] lawyer shall not knowingly . . .
reveal a confidence or secret of his client."1°6 A confidence is defined
as "information protected by the attorney-client privilege under ap-
plicable law."' 7 Secrets are "other information gained in the profes-
sional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or
the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or detrimental to the
client."
The Model Rules expand this definition in some areas and re-
strict it in others. The Code covers only information garnered from
the professional relationship between the attorney and client."0 In
contrast, the Rules abandon the distinction between confidences and
secrets and protect all information about a client "relating to repre-
sentation" whether it was obtained before, after, or during the pro-
fessional relationship. 10
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
See Abramovsky, A Case for Increased Confidentiality, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 11
(1985) for a detailed analysis of the attorney's duty to preserve client confidences. Abramovsky
remarks that "[ulnless an attorney is well informed, it is impossible for him to meet his ethical
obligation to represent clients zealously and effectively." Id. at 12. In People v. Beige, 83
Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, affd, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dept. 1975),
af'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976), the lower court stated: "The
effectiveness of counsel is only as great as the confidentiality of its client-attorney relationship.
If the lawyer cannot get all the facts about the case, he can only give his client half of a
defense." 83 Misc. 2d at 189, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 801. See also Hersch, Ethical Considerations of
the Immigration Lawyer, 51 FLA. B.J. 18 (1977).
Another commentator observes:
Historically, it has been presumed that an adversary system implemented by the
legal profession is the best method of judicial resolution of controversies. . . . In
the administration of justice, it is the adversary system that has been constructed
to deal with this aspect of human nature. . . . To represent their clients zeal-
ously, attorneys are expected to exploit this system.
Kuhn, Disclosure versus Confidentiality, 29 CATH. LAW. 356, 357-58 (1984).
104. See infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text. The code protects information ob-
tained during the professional relationship between the attorney and client. The rules, on the
other hand, protect all confidential information garnered from the client.
105. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1979).
106. Id. DR 4-101(B)(1).
107. Id. DR 4-101(A).
108. Id.
109. Abramovsky, supra note 103, at 8. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY DR 4-101(A).
110. Abramovsky, supra note 103, at 8. Abramovsky notes that even information com-
ing from third parties or "obtained prior to or after the existence of the attorney-client rela-
tionship" is protected. Id. See generally Vickrey, Tell It Only to the Judge: Disclosure of
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The Rules limit the type of information that may be disclosed,
while the Code allows disclosure of client confidences in a variety of
situations."' The Rules permit disclosure only when the lawyer be-
lieves disclosure will prevent the client from committing a crime
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm."'
Both the Code and the Rules allow attorneys to withdraw from
representation and mandate disclosure if the client perjures himself
before a court or tribunal." 8 Disciplinary Rule 7-102 directs the at-
torney who received "clear information" that his client "perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal" to command the client to rectify
the fraud. If the client refuses, the attorney must reveal this refusal
to rectify the fraud to the court.1 '
The Rules also compel lawyers to inform the court of client
perjury if the client refuses to remedy the effects of his fraud."
However, the Rules allow attorneys to withdraw from the case
before revealing a client's untruths to 'the court."'
Client Confidences Under A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 60 N.D.L. REV. 261
(1984). See also Nahstoll, The Lawyer's Allegiance: Priorities Regarding Confidentiality, 41
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 421 (1984).
111. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) which
states: "A lawyer may reveal ... [tihe intention of his client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime," and Rule 1.6(B)(1) of the MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, which states: "A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."
112. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983).
113. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
114. The text of MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1)
states:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: His client has, in
the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal
shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or
is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal,
except when the information is protected as a privileged communication.
Id.
115. The remedial measures offered by the rules are as follows: remonstrate with the
client confidentially. If this fails, withdrawal is recommended. Finally, disclosure is allowed.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1983).
116. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a) (1983) states:
Except as stated in Paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a
client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the
interests of the client, or if:
(1) The client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's service
that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) The client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or
fraud. . ..
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III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Differing interpretations of the Model Code and Model Rules
and the lack of precedent defining lawyers' ethical obligations in im-
migration law practice result in a moral "trilemma. 11 7 On one level,
attorneys must obey INS regulations.1 8 Superimposed on this duty
is the obligation to comply with the ABA Code or Rules as adopted
or amended by each state's bar association. 9 The duty to preserve
the truth is pitted against honoring the attorney-client privilege.
This trilemma is further complicated because the Code and
Rules mandate disclosure of client fraud in some circumstances, 20
yet prohibit it in others.' 2 The lack of consensus in case law among
jurisdictions further compounds the attorney's ethical maze.'22
The decision to disclose information concerning the validity of a
client's marriage creates an even greater legal and moral paradox.
Revealing suspected or actual perjury may result in criminal charges
for misrepresenting a material fact to the INS.' 28 Disclosing confi-
dential information, however, contravenes the ethical privilege as
stipulated in the Model Code and Rules. 24
The penalties for violating the ethical standard of disclosure are
almost identical to the penalties imposed for violating the federal
regulations.' 5 It is virtually impossible for a conscientious attorney
to follow one set of rules without breaching the others. Uniformity is
required between the various statutes and regulations. Precise defini-
tions governing the immigration lawyer's ethical obligations when
filing for marriage visas are required.
117. Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional and Ethical
Issues, 70 MINN. L. REV. 121, 123 (1985). "The lawyer is required to know everything, to
keep it in confidence, and to reveal it to the court." Id.
118. See 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a) (1988). See also Heiserman, Professional Responsibility in
Immigration Practice and Government Service, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 977, 978-80 (1985).
119. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
120. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3).
121. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(B)(1).
122. See supra notes 45 and 47 and accompanying text.
123. 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a)(3) (1988).
124. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4; MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b).
125. See 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a)(3) (1988). See also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Reckless Disregard Test Versus the Clear and Convincing
Evidence Test
The first step toward revising and clarifying the lawyer's ethical
responsibility in the Immigration Bar begins with the elimination of
the reckless disregard test and replacing it with the clear and con-
vincing evidence test."2 6 As noted earlier in Sarantos, the defendant
argued that the reckless disregard standard was inappropriate to sus-
tain a criminal conviction for defrauding the INS because it forces1' 7
attorneys to become "investigative arms of the government.""28 The
court asserted that the attorney-client relationship was preserved be-
cause no investigation was necessary unless the fraud was obvious.""
Without a definition of obvious fraud, attorneys have no way to
gauge whether or not they have violated the reckless disregard
standard.
Thus, the effect of Sarantos is to shift the burden of investigat-
ing sham marriages from the INS to attorneys. The INS is an or-
ganization created solely for the purpose of enforcing immigration
laws.130 Attorneys, on the other hand, have an ethical duty to "re-
present their clients zealously within the bounds of the law." ' In
In re Timon, Timon recognized the fundamental differences between
the role of the INS and that of attorneys when he argued that the
veracity of his client's claims should be substantiated by the INS, not
by attorneys.1 "
The reckless disregard standard suggests that attorneys should
interrogate clients before representation or risk reprimand. Thus, the
practitioner is placed in a position adverse to his client's interests.
Such a standard erodes the mutual trust on which the attorney-client
relationship is based. This trust is especially crucial when alien cli-
ents are involved. The outcome of a visa application will often de-
pend on successful communications between the attorney and his for-
eign client. As one commentator noted:
The immigrant often is a complete stranger to the customs and
126. Sarantos, 455 F.2d at 877; Legal Services Center, 615 F. Supp. at 958.
127. 455 F.2d at 880.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 881.
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982).
131. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1985).
132. In re Timon, 40 A.D.2d 58, 337 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1972).
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language of this country. He or she is often unfamiliar not only
with the laws of the country but also with the way our system
of justice operates and the goals it seeks to achieve. The fear of
returning to a country where he or she faces possibly physical
or mental persecution, economic hardship, or separation from
family already in the United States, cannot be underestimated.
Therefore, it is imperative that the immigration client feel se-
cure in discussions with his attorney."'
The clear and convincing evidence test, advanced in Legal Ser-
vices Center,1s ' avoids the ethical dilemma created by the reckless
disregard test: whether to investigate a client's integrity and destroy
the attorney-client relationship, or not investigate and risk sanctions.
The Legal Services Center court correctly recognized that to require
an attorney to "ascertain the truth or falsity of his client's assertions"
is "fundamentally inconsistent" with the duty to "represent a client
zealously." The court noted that Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) re-
quires an attorney to rectify client fraud only on the basis of "clear
information," and that "[tlo subject a lawyer to the obligation of in-
vestigating his client's assertion on less than 'clear information'
would undoubtedly undermine a client's confidence in his
attorney."13 5
Thus, the clear and convincing evidence requirement alleviates
the difficulties encountered in using the reckless disregard test.""
"Clear" denotes knowledge gained through actual client confessions
or other reliable means. An investigation is not warranted unless
there is overwhelming evidence that the client intends to perpetrate a
fraud. " " The clear and convincing evidence test is superior to the
reckless disregard test because it preserves the autonomy of the attor-
ney-client relationship.
B. The Duty to Investigate Under the Code and Rules
While Sarantos implies that attorneys must investigate a cli-
ent's marriage when confronted with obvious falsehoods or risk cen-
sure,"3 s the Model Code and Rules'differ as to whether or not inves-
tigation is mandatory. The Model Code coincides with the Sarantos
rationale. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(6) dictates that an attorney
133. Hersch, supra note 103, at 20.
134. 615 F. Supp. at 969.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 455 F.2d at 881.
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"cannot participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when
it is obvious that the evidence is false.""' Arguably, an attorney who
suspects fraud and files a petition with the INS acts recklessly by
preserving false evidence. Furthermore, the same ambiguities sur-
rounding the definition of obvious fraud seen in Sarantos exist in the
Model Code.'40
For purposes of detecting sham marriages, the Model Rules are
superior to the Model Code because they take an approach more
consistent with the clear and convincing evidence test.1 4' They pro-
hibit a lawyer from "assisting a client in conduct the lawyer knows
is fraudulent.'4 Use of the word "knows" suggests absolute knowl-
edge, gained from unequivocal evidence of client fraud.143 This dif-
ference between the Model Code and the final version of the Rules
shows that the ABA intended to strengthen the attorney-client privi-
lege.144 Thus, under the Rules, attorneys would not be required to
verify their client's statements unless clear and convincing" 5 evi-
dence of fraud existed.
C. The Duty to Disclose Suspected Fraud: The Model Code and
Rules
The above section discussed the point at which attorneys are
required to question visa applicants regarding the validity of their
marriage. Another problem that attorneys face in the sham marriage
context also involves timing: When does the duty to disclose sus-
pected or actual fraud arise?
Difficulties which arise in interpreting the Model Code and
Model Rules can be illustrated by two hypotheticals:
1. A client comes to an attorney for an interview and openly
confesses that he or she has entered a marriage solely for immigra-
tion purposes. Must an attorney disclose this fact to the INS?
2. A client asks an attorney to file an 1-30 petition on his or her
139. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(6) (1985).
140. Id.
141. Legal Services Center, 615 F. Supp. at 969.
142. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1983).
143. An earlier version of the Rules contained the words "knows or reasonably should
know." Id. Rule 1.2(d) (Discussion Draft 1981). This version parallels the reckless disregard
test; it can be inferred that "reasonable" knowledge constitutes information which less than
"clearly" establishes client perjury. This assertion is supported by the fact that the framers of
the Rules deleted "reasonably should know" because they felt it detrimentally weakened the
attorney-client privilege.
144. Id.
145. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(6) (1985).
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behalf. The practitioner suspects that the client's marriage is a sham.
Is there a duty to disclose his or her suspicions to the INS?
In the first situation, the resolution of the problem is relatively
straightforward. Under the Model Rules, an attorney would clearly
be justified in refusing representation.146 It is arguable that the attor-
ney must disclose fraud to the INS when no papers have yet been
filed. 1 7 Canon 4 requires the lawyer to preserve the "confidences
and secrets of a client."14 Thus, the lawyer could probably conceal
his client's marriage from the INS although he or she might feel an
ethical obligation to reveal the marriage. Furthermore, since no pa-
pers have yet been filed, a willful misrepresentation has not yet oc-
curred. The attorney is thus protected from criminal indictment. 4 '
However, it would be extremely unwise for an attorney to file an I-
30 petition in this situation. The attorney-client privilege does not
apply to attorneys who knowingly file false petitions with the INS,
and criminal charges would most certainly result.1 50
The area of most concern for immigration attorneys is the sec-
ond hypothetical situation. Application of the Model Rules and Code
to this dilemma warrant non-disclosure of suspected fraud. Requir-
ing otherwise would violate the attorney's duty in an adversary sys-
tem to preserve the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship.
51
This assertion is supported by the fact, as noted earlier, that the
recent revision in the Model Rules has solidified the attorney-client
relationship. For example, the Rules do not mandate disclosure, ex-
cept in the case of serious crimes.1 ' Rule 3.3 also reflects this trend.
It allows the attorney the option of taking remedial measures to rem-
edy the effects of false information presented by the client.1 '
The Code, however, is slanted against client-lawyer confidenti-
ality. Its scope is narrower than the Rules because it places no limits
on the types of crimes which may be revealed.154 Since defrauding
the INS is a crime,155 the Code would mandate disclosure. In cases
146. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a) (1983).
147. Id.
148. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A)-(B)(2) (1985).
149. 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(A)(3) (1988).
150. J. HING, supra note 10, § 4.24 (most common and statutory law attorney-client
privilege rules imply that the privilege is not applicable when client seeks legal help to perpe-
trate a fraud). See, e.g., CAL. EViD. CODE § 956 (West 1984).
151. Kuhn, supra note 103, at 357-58.
152. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983).
153. Id. Rule 3.3.
154. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1985).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
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of suspected fraud, attorneys who failed to disclose their suspicions to
the INS would risk disbarment or suspension from their state's bar
association. 1"
The Rules, however, ameliorate the ethical conflict created by
the Code. According to the Rules, suspected fraud could not be re-
vealed because it is not one of the serious crimes enumerated in Rule
1.6.1" Therefore, in unclear cases, attorneys would feel safe in not
revealing their suspicions.
Since the Rules give attorneys the option of revealing client
fraud, ' it is reasonable to assume that in situation two, an attorney
would be entirely justified in not revealing his or her suspicions to
the INS. Allowing attorneys the option of disclosing suspected fraud
is not violative of the spirit of the Rules. Were attorneys expected to
reveal suspected fraud, a perversion of the Rules' purpose would re-
sult. For example, filing a petition with the INS, while simultane-
ously alleging the existence of suspected fraud, would prejudice the
application, probably precluding the client from receiving a fair and
objective evaluation of his or her marital status. The result would be
extremely unfair to the client if the attorney were misguided in his
or her suspicions and the client's visa were denied.
In conclusion, a standard that does not require an attorney to
divulge suspected fraud allows the attorney to represent his client
with all the zeal that is ideally required. If fraud is suspected, how-
ever, that determination is best made during an interview with the
INS.
V. PROPOSAL
In order to ensure effective representation by immigration attor-
neys who wish to shield themselves from charges of unethical con-
duct, the INS must promulgate specific guidelines for lawyers han-
dling marriage visas. The guidelines should contain profiles of
typical sham marriages. Suggested questions designed to test the via-
bility of a marriage would also serve as a useful tool in exposing
marital schemes (these questions would be optional so as not to vio-
late the attorney-client privilege).
In addition, since many lawyers are unaware of their legal lia-
bility for involvement in sham marriage rings, the guidelines should
contain a summary of the penalties imposed for filing illegitimate I-
156. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
157. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
158. Id.
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30 petitions. Such warnings would deter attorneys from filing sus-
pect petitions.
These standards would also help immigration attorneys make
informed choices as to whether or not representation is warranted. In
addition, attorneys who unwittingly file false petitions would have a
better chance of being exonerated of wrongdoing if they show that
their client's marriage matched the INS's description of a legitimate
marriage.' 9
The INS should also recognize the clear and convincing evi-
dence test'" (as opposed to the reckless disregard test)"' for measur-
ing attorney fraud. The clear and convincing evidence test permits
attorneys to honor both the attorney-client privilege and the goals of
the INS.
At the outset, a definition of clear and convincing evidence
should be introduced.16' For example, clear evidence could denote
statements by the client admitting the sham nature of the mar-
riage.1 63 Clear evidence could also include reliable evidence, volunta-
rily offered by third parties, or documentary items such as non-joint
tax returns or disparate addresses. 6
The clear and convincing evidence test alleviates the attorney's
ethical dilemma in gray-area marriage cases. If the facts surrounding
the marriage are ambiguous, the attorney's personal moral views
may compel him or her to decline representation, even if there is no
clear evidence of fraud."' However, the denial of representation in
nebulous cases might violate the lawyer's duty to "represent . . .cli-
ent[s] zealously within the bounds of the law.""' As noted earlier,
disparity in socio-economic status between couples does not always
signal marital fraud. Those with suspected marriages may be de-
prived of the opportunity to have their union validated by the INS if
a standard less than the clear and convincing evidence test is utilized.
Thus, the clear and convincing evidence test affords attorneys the
option of pursuing representation if the facts surrounding the mar-
riage are ambiguous.
The INS's interests are protected because the clear and convinc-
159. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
160. Legal Services Center, 615 F. Supp. at 958.
161. Sarantos, 455 F.2d at 877.
162. Legal Services Center, 615 F. Supp. at 969.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1985).
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ing evidence standard eliminates the most blatant cases of fraud.167
The burden of detecting sham marriages then shifts from attorneys
to the INS.
Finally, the INS should officially recognize the Model Rules16
and Disciplinary Rule 7-102 of the Model Code as the prevailing
ethical standard for immigration attorneys. Presently, the ABA's
goal of a uniform set of ethical norms is hindered by the wide spec-
trum of ethical codes among the states."" Since the INS has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over members of its bar, immigration lawyers would
be subject to the ethical axioms it adopts.
Specifically, Rules 1.6, 1.16 and 3.31"1 comply with the letter
and spirit of the INS regulations and the attorney's obligations to the
legal system. Rule 1.6 recognizes the absolute sanctity of the ethical
privilege, thus furthering the attorney's goal of communicating fully
and frankly with the client.'17 However, the Rules also preserve INS
ideals. Rule 1.16 requires withdrawal if the attorney's services are
utilized to perpetrate fraud.'17 This standard has a chilling effect on
attorneys who would hide behind the confidentiality requirement of
Rule 1.6.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) of the Model Code is also useful
because it incorporates the clear and convincing evidence test,7
which weighs in favor of the attorney's interest, and mandates disclo-
sure of client perjury." This effectively recognizes the INS's
objective. 7 15
The scattered and ambiguous rules in force today governing the
ethical behavior of immigration attorneys impair the ability of these
practitioners to represent the client zealously 17' and effectively. With
uniformity comes efficiency and understanding. Thus, a codification
of the tests for fraud and the ethics rules would foster better relations
between the Immigration Bar and the INS. As a result, both organi-
zations would be better prepared to fulfill their obligations to their
167. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
168. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.3, 1.16, 1.2, and 1.6 (1983).
169. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
170. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.6, 1.16, 3.3 (1983).
171. Id. Preamble.
172. Id. Rule 1.6.
173. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B) (1985).
174. Id.
175. For a discussion of the history and purpose of the INS, see CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., HISTORY OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI-
ZATION SERVICE (1981).
176. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1985).
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clients and the community.
VI. CONCLUSION
As sham marriage statistics increase, 1" the INS will search for
more effective modes of detection. Some of these solutions will, un-
doubtedly, involve greater scrutiny of the Immigration Bar.178 It is,
therefore, in the immigration lawyer's best interest to understand his
or her legal and ethical obligations under current laws and
regulations.
This comment addressed the ethical problems attorneys encoun-
ter when representing clients applying for visas based on marriages
to United States citizens. The background (Section III) explained the
relevant law governing the attorney's conduct in the sham marriage
context: federal regulation, 7 case law, 80 and the ABA Code and
Rules of Professional Conduct.181
Section III also analyzed and synthesized these laws on two
levels. First, case law was discussed. The reckless disregard test, used
to determine culpability in marriage fraud schemes, was discounted
because it erodes the attorney-client relationship. Second, the duty to
discover and disclose client fraud was examined according to the
Model Code and Rules. Because the Code and Rules are fraught
with inconsistencies and are not uniformly followed by the states,
there is no clear-cut solution to the above issues. However, imposing
a duty to investigate and reveal suspected perjury would violate the
attorney-client privilege.
Finally, this comment proposed that the solution to the above
issues would best be achieved by expanding the INS guidelines regu-
lating and delineating attorneys' ethical conduct as members of the
Immigration Bar.
Until change is effected, however, immigration attorneys must
continue their struggle to interpret INS regulations, case law and the
ABA Code and Rules in the context of their own personal experi-
ence and moral perceptions.
Taryn L. Hook
177. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
178. L.A. Daily J., Jul. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
179. 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(A)(3) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
180. Sarantos, 455 F.2d at 877.
181. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
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